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By D. BROWARD CRAIG
A.B., LL.B., Harvard University; Member, New York Bar
T HE ATMOSPHERE surrounding the earth is generally considered
to be composed of four layers, each having its own peculiar charac-
teristics. The bottommost layer is called the troposphere, the layer of
dense air in which we live, and is roughly ten miles thick at the equator
and five miles thick at the poles. Next comes the stratosphere, which
rises upward from the top of the troposphere to a height of about fifty
miles above the Earth. Above the stratosphere is the third layer, the
ionosphere, which extends outward several hundred miles to the fourth
and topmost atmospheric layer. This, the exosphere, is the layer in
which the atmosphere gradually merges into interplanetary space; it
may extend as far as 18,000 miles out beyond the Earth.
Commercial flight today is carried on almost entirely in the tropo-
sphere and the highest known flights by airplanes of any kind have not
gone beyond the lower regions of the stratosphere, being less than
twenty miles above the Earth. However, in the last few years such
strides have been made in research that man-made rockets and satel-
lites have been thrust well into the exosphere, and plans are confidently
being made to project human beings to such altitudes. This develop-
ment has, not unnaturally, required rethinking concerning many of
what were formerly the basic scientific postulates of aerial navigation,
with the result that some of those postulates have been severely modi-
fied or even discarded (as, for example, the premise that the presence
of air was necessary for flight).
In parallel fashion, it is considered that the recent radical develop-
ment of the technique of flight, with the attendant vast increase in the
area in which flight is believed to be feasible, requires a reanalysis of
the basic legal rules which have evolved during the last half century to
govern flight above the Earth. The most basic international legal prin-
ciple in this field, underlying the documents governing international
aviation (notably the Paris Convention of 1919,' which formerly
reigned supreme, and the Chicago Convention of 1944,2 which forms
the present central law on the subject), is that each nation is sovereign
over and exercises exclusive control in the airspace above its territory.
This paper will be devoted to a re-examination of that concept in the
light of the anticipated advances in flight technology, the intent being
to determine whether or not the national sovereignty doctrine as out-
lined above should be considered to be properly applicable to altitudes
above those now in commercial use.
1 Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 11 League of Nations
Treaty Series 173 (1922); 17 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 195 (1923).
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat., pt. 2, 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591.
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It is considered that in the presentation of the material which fol-
lows, logical development requires, first, a statement of what the present
basic rules governing flight are, together with an exposition of the
practical necessities underlying those rules. Next must follow a mar-
shalling of the significant facts making a re-examination of the existing
rules desirable or necessary. Then, if those facts indicate that revision
of present concepts may be advisable with respect to the areas of space
not now governed by them, the arguments in favor of alternative
theories must be developed. And finally, conclusions must be reached
as to what is considered to be the proper rule of sovereignty to be
applied at high altitudes.
I. THE LAW TODAY
The accepted international law governing flight above the Earth up
to an altitude to be discussed shortly is clearcut. Each nation of the
world is sovereign over the airspace above its territory and territorial
waters, and, except as it limits itself by international agreement, it may
permit or prohibit flight in that airspace at its discretion. Airspace
over the high seas beyond national territorial waters is free to all and
is incapable of appropriation by any nation. In order to ascertain the
boundaries of a nation's airspace, a roughly conical projection may be
drawn from the center of the Earth through the nation's boundaries on
the surface of the Earth and on into the sky. Thus at a high altitude
the national airspace boundaries will be larger than the national boun-
daries on the surface of the Earth.
The law as stated above is not old. Nor has it always been firmly
entrenched. A short history of the development of the law will be
useful in illustrating the reasons why national sovereignty over super-
jacent airspace is the rule today. Also, it may help to clarify whether or
not today's rule will be extended to form tomorrow's law of high
altitude flight.
In the early years of the present century, shortly before and imme-
diately after the advent of the aeroplane, scholarly controversy raged
over whether the earthly sovereignty of nations extended to the heavens
or whether the airspace was and must remain free, res communis, or
whether some intermediate concept was more appropriate. Fauchille
was the great exponent of freedom of the air, although he admitted
State sovereignty for purposes of security up to a low altitude (even-
tually 330 meters) .8 The strongest opposition to this theory came from
Westlake, who advocated national sovereignty over the superjacent
airspace up to the heavens.4 Many writers joined the battle on each
side.5
3 "Le Domaine Aerien et le Regime Juridique des Aerostats," 8 Revue Generale
de Droit International Public 414 (1901); Traite de Droit International Public(8th ed. of Bonfils' Manuel de Droit International), vol. 1, pt. II, 581, 586 (1925).
4 21 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International [hereinafter Annuaire] 297-
299 (1906) (quoted in Hazeltine, The Law of the Air 15, 34-36 (1911)) ; see Cooper,
"High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," 4 International Law Quarterly
411, 412 (1951).
5 To name a few, Fauchille was followed by Nys, Meili, Oppenheim, and Ferber;
Westlake by von Bar, Meurer, Wilson, and notably, Lycklama a Nijeholt.
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In 1906 the Institut de Droit International adopted a draft law of
the air, written, by Fauchille and incorporating his views.6 In 1910 an
International Conference on Air Navigation met in Paris to settle the
question. It accomplished little of lasting importance, although its
working papers were extensively referred to in the next international
conference on the subject. Agreement between the Fauchille and
Westlake schools was at least reached in one respect: all considered that
a plane of one nation had the right to fly into another nation so long
as the security of the latter State and its inhabitants was not endan-
gered thereby.7
In 1919, following World War I, a subcommittee of the Aero-
nautical Commission of the Peace Conference met to consider the
question of the law of the air. It drafted the Paris Convention of 1919,8
widely ratified (but not by the United States), which proclaimed in
Article 1 thereof that every nation had exclusive sovereignty of the
airspace over it. No mention was made of the right of innocent passage,
so generally agreed upon in 1910, the contracting parties merely agree-
ing to allow each other such privileges. Interesting in this respect is
the analysis of Professor Goedhuis of Holland, which shows that the
intent of the drafters was not to eliminate innocent passage as a right
as between the contracting parties but merely as a right upon which the
nations which had been vanquished could insist.9
The United States in its international relations long fought for the
principle of the freedom of the air (to the extent at least of freedom
of innocent passage), arguing for such a concept as late as 192810
(although in 1926 the United States enacted a law governing interstate
aviation within its borders," in which it was stated that the United
States is sovereign over its superjacent airspace12 ) . It was in the small
minority, the majority being composed in large part of smaller states
not so well equipped to compete for the air commerce market as the
United States. During the 1930's this country and most of the others
left in the "free air" camp abandoned the struggle and turned to the
absolute national sovereignty theory of international air law. 13 Pro-
fessor Goedhuis has argued cogently that this conversion was the result
of a decision that if other nations would not open their territories to
American air commerce by adoption of the free air concept, the same
object could be attained if the United States also closed its skies,
6 21 Annuaire 297, 327 (1906).
7 See Goedhuis, "Civil Aviation After the War," 36 A.J.I.L. 596, 598-599 (1942).
8 See note 1, supra.
9 "Civil Aviation After the War," supra, 599-601. The thought of limiting the
air rights of vanquished foes arose after World War II also (Wilberforce, "Some
Recent Developments in the International Law of Aviation," 35 Grot. Soc. 73
(1950)).
10 See Goedhuis, supra, 601-602, 604.
11 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171, 174-177, 179-184.
1244 Stat. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. 176 (1952). Within the United States, the
various states have asserted sovereign rights in their superjacent airspace, a con-
tention which has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court (Braniff
Airways v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 74 S. Ct. 757 (1954)).
'3 See Goedhuis, supra, 603-606.
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opening them only to the extent that another country would grant
equal privileges to United States enterprises.' 4 It is interesting to note
that even during this period of increasing nationalism, the technical
advances being made in aviation formed the basis for at least one
learned plea for a return to the concepts of Fauchille. 15
In 1944, the Chicago Conference, including representatives from
almost all nations involved in air travel problems except the U.S.S.R.,
met at the invitation of the United States to chart the path of post
World War II aviation. It adopted the Paris Convention tenet that
every nation is sovereign over the airspace above it.16 This appeared to
settle the question of sovereignty definitively. A sort of modified right
of innocent passage was provided for in a companion agreement which
was fairly widely accepted. 17 This, the so-called "two freedoms,"
granted to airplanes of a contracting State the right (1) to fly over
the territory of another contracting State without stopping and (2) to
land and take off within a foreign contracting State so long as no cargo
or passengers were loaded or unloaded. A "five freedoms" agreement, 8
granting broader, more commercially important rights has never at-
tained wide effect, for lack of sufficient ratifiers, although it has served
as the basis for some bilateral agreements. It is noteworthy that the
"five freedoms" agreement was proposed by the United States.' 9 For
noncommercial flight, innocent passage was provided for in the Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation itself.20
Examination of the conventions of the last half century and of their
preparatory work discloses certain dominant strains underlying the
national sovereignty concept of airspace:
With respect to civil aviation, the dominant factor has been eco-
nomic. States, especially the smaller ones, have tried to strictly limit
the amount of foreign air travel coming into and leaving their borders;
the attempt has been to build up domestically owned airlines and to
tax and control foreign ones. Larger States, which at first advocated
free air travel, have changed their views as a result of coming, through
experience, to believe that the best available way to expand air com-
merce into the smaller, more restrictive countries is to demand quid
pro quo on a governmental level in the matter of airport and route
rights. The significance of the economic aspect is made clear by the
widespread adoption of the "two freedoms" rule and the general rejec-
tion of the "five freedoms" rule.21
14 Id. at 604.
15 Korovine, "La Conquete de la Stratosphere et le Droit International," 41
Revue Generale de Droit International Public 675 (1934).
16 See note 2, supra. For a convenient grouping of the various Chicago Confer-
ence texts, see 39 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 111 et seq. (1945).
17 International Air Services Transit Agreement, E.A.S. 487.
18 International Air Transport Agreement, E.A.S. 488.
19 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, vol. 1, pp. 517-518
(Dept. State pub. 2820) (1944).
20 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 8upra, Art. 5.
21 See Ryan, "Policy Issues in International Air Transportation," 16 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 443, 450 (1948).
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In military aviation, on the other hand, the dominant factor has
been security. It has been generally accepted that it is not desirable
to have uninvited foreign military planes flying over national territory.
However, discussions. of sovereignty since World War I have not con-
cerned themselves greatly with this matter, perhaps because it has been
obvious that States would not allow themselves to be so endangered.
There is a question, of course, whether it is necessary to assert air
sovereignty in order to prevent such action, for the principles of private
law assault might well be adopted to make actionable threatening
flights of that type and to justify reasonable measures taken in self-
defense in those situations. The view has been expressed, furthermore,
that the military security element in the justification of national air
sovereignty will diminish if President Eisenhower's mutual aerial
inspection plan becomes a reality.22
A third factor is derived from private law. The adjustment of
private disputes and the regulation of private conduct have been func-
tions of the territorial sovereign as long as the concept of sovereignty
has existed. Disputes between individuals concerning alleged private
rights above the Earth date back at least as far as the Roman Empire,
and an elaborate body of law concerning invasions of private rights in
airspace was in existence at that early date.2 3 Of course, the early law
of the air was concerned with such matters as trees, overhanging build-
ings, and the like, but the point is that there is no record of a territorial
sovereign ever having refused to determine private rights in air because
he did not consider his jurisdiction to extend to the airspace over his
territory. If he had not undertaken to decide such matters, it is unlikely
that any peaceful forum would have been available.
In modern days, the problem has not been so different as might
at first appear. The territorial sovereign has, of necessity if nothing
else, determined private rights in the air over his domain.24 In most
cases, if he had declined this function, no forum would have been avail-
able for the peaceful settlement of such disputes. Going one step
farther, the sovereign has sought to prevent disputes arising by affirma-
tively regulating conduct in the airspace over his territory.25 Certainly
no other power could show a better right to take such action, at least
in the absence of an appropriate international body. It is believed
that this development of internal law basically affected the concept of
sovereignty in the parallel development of international law.
One significant question concerning today's generally accepted view
that airspace is subject to the sovereignty of subjacent nations has been
left in abeyance in the above discussion. The question is whether or
not the airspace sovereignty concept as developed has a built-in altitude
22 Young, "The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Space Sovereignty," 24 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 565 (1956).
23 Montmorency, "The Control of Air Spaces," 3 Grot. Soc. 61 (1918) ; Cooper,
"Roman Law and the Maxim 'Cujus Est Solum' in International Air Law," 1 McGill
L. J. 23 (1952).
24 E.g., U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946).
25 See e.g., Air Commerce Act of 1926, supra.
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limitation. That such is the case has been argued forcefully by Pro-
fessor Cooper who contends that (1) the maxim "cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelum" (he who owns the soil owns it to the heavens) is
not authority for the proposition that a nation is sovereign over all the
space above it and (2) that the word "airspace" as used in international
conventions of this century is limited to the region in which reactions
of the gaseous air will support flight (this area extends less than forty
miles above the Earth), thus limiting to that region the scope of the
conventional declarations of national airspace sovereignty.26 The first
point is convincingly demonstrated in his article "Roman Law and the
Maxim 'Cujus Est Solum' in International Air Law, ' '27 which estab-
lishes the fact that the maxim was developed with respect to trees,
overhanging buildings, etc., and was never intended to solve problems
in the upper air or above. In favor of his second assertion is the fact
that the Paris Convention of 1919, dealing with "aircraft" in "airspace,"
defined "aircraft" in the Annexes which formed a part of the Conven-
tion as comprising "all machines which can derive support in the
atmosphere from reactions of the air" and that the Chicago Convention
of 1944 adopted the Paris Convention statement on sovereignty.28 No
definition of "airspace" or "aircraft" appears in the Chicago Conven-
tion, although the continuing body created by it (International Civil
Aviation Organization) has adopted in essence the Paris Convention
definition of "aircraft" as one of its guide rules. 29 Professor Cooper's
analysis is persuasive, at least insofar as it delineates the extent to which
nations by treaty have committed themselves to the sovereignty con-
cept.30
26 Cooper, "Legal Problems of Upper Space," Proceedings, American Society
of International Law, 1956, 85, 88-89, wherein the present legal situation is stated
to be as follows:
"(a) Both the Paris and Chicago conventions have dealt only with
those flight instrumentalities which derive support in the atmosphere
from reactions of the air, such as the balloon or airplane, and have not
dealt with such instrumentalities as rockets, satellites, and other space
craft which are designed to move through space without atmospheric
support.
"(b) The Chicago Convention contains no definition of 'airspace' but
it may well be argued that, as it was adapted from the Paris Conven-
tion, it deals with no areas of space other than those parts of the
atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support
balloons and airplanes. The highest flight by an unmanned balloon up
to the present time is 140,000 feet, by a manned balloon 72,395 feet,
and the highest airplane flight is 90,000 feet.
"(c) Nothing in the Chicago Convention precludes the possibility of
State sovereignty being extended by international agreement, or by
unilateral force, above the areas in which the airplane and balloon can
be used, but there is certainly no basis on which any customary inter-
national law can as yet be considered applicable to such higher areas.
"(d) Airspace over the high seas is now free for use by all."
See also Cooper, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," supra, 413-414.
27 1 McGill L. J. 23 (1952). See also U.S. v. Causby, supra, at 261.
28 See pp. 386-387, supra. "Airspace" was not defined in the Paris Convention
of 1919.29 Annex 7 to the International Convention on Civil Aviation, "Aircraft Na-
tionality and Registration Marks" (ICAO) (2d ed., 1953).
30 Most other recent writers on the subject have declared that existing law
should be considered to be inapplicable to the upper altitudes. See, e.g., Aaronson,
"Earth Satellites and the Law," 220 Law Times 115 (1955); Schachter, "Who
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A contrary argument has been made, notably by Ming-Min Peng,31
who contends that at least until interplanetary travel becomes a reality
the sovereignty of nations over the space above them should be con-
sidered to extend to the limits of flight. His argument is that (1)
nations have always considered themselves supreme in the whole area
above their territory and (2) the sovereignty statements in the con-
ventions of this century were never considered by the contracting
parties to be limitative in nature, claims of sovereignty being made to
the limits of space thought to be usable by man.32 Peng's first proposi-
tion is probably as true as Cooper's apparently contrary one, at least
if it is taken to mean that no nation has ever conceded that its airspace
was subject to the supremacy of any other nation. However, this is not
the same as saying that at no altitude may the space above a nation's
borders be considered res communis (in the sense of being common
to all and incapable of appropriation). As a matter of practical intent,
the second contention also has merit, and the continued use of the term
"airspace" in 1944 may well have been for lack of a better word. How-
ever, the fact that nations may have consistently claimed sovereignty to
as great a height as at the time was reasonably in issue does not mean
that therefore nations have asserted sovereignty to higher altitudes
than were in contemplation at the time. At most it means that it may
reasonably be expected that when the question of sovereignty in higher
altitudes comes to be raised, similar assertions will in all probability
be made.
Whatever may be said for the two views outlined above, two things
are clear: the practical problem of regulating flight in upper and outer
space had not arisen when the mentioned conventions were drafted,
and those documents were primarily intended to solve practical prob-
lems in parts of space which were then in commercial and military use.
It is submitted that the concepts of sovereignty set forth in the Chicago
Convention should be applied or not applied in the upper regions on
the basis of practical determinations, such as those which underlay the
development of the theory for lower altitudes, rather than on the basis
of a determination of the scientific scope of the term "airspace.133
II. TESTING TODAY'S LAW FOR APPLICATION TO TOMORROW'S
HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHT
It has been stated above that three factors underlay the development
of national sovereignty in the lower altitudes: commercial develop-
ment, military security, and private law necessities. Solutions to prob-
lems in those areas were considered by most nations to be best resolved
Owns the Universe?," in Across the Space Frontier, 118-137 (Ryan ed., 1952);
Jenks, "International Law and Activities in Space," 5 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 99(1956); Haley, "Space Law-Basic Concepts," 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 643 (1956); Mc-
Dougal, "Artificial Satellites: A Modest Proposal," 51 A.J.I.L. 74 (1957).
31 "Le Vol a Haute Altitude et l'Article 1 de la Convention de Chicago, 1944,"
12 Revue du Barreau 277 (1952).
32 Ibid.
33 Space may contain "air" as far away from the Earth as 18,000 miles (Engel,
"Mystery of the Air we Explore," N. Y. Times Magazine, April 15, 1956, pp. 27, 64).
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by adopting the principle of exclusive national sovereignty, coupled
with provisions for certain rights of innocent passage and distress
landing.
Flight as contemplated in the altitudes above those now commer-
cially in use will have certain characteristics differing in pertinent
fashion from the type of flight which has served as the basis for the
development of the national sovereignty principle:
First, in all likelihood, the physical objective of a flight will be
different from what is now considered normal, in that instead of pro-
ceeding from one place on the surface of the Earth to another place
on the surface of the Earth, the flight will ordinarily proceed from a
place on the Earth to a place away from the Earth or from a place away
from the Earth to a place on the Earth (or to another place away from
the Earth).
Second, at high altitudes it is considered possible to have continu-
ous flights around the Earth without any necessity to return thereto,
this to be accomplished by placing an artificial satellite in an orbit
circling the Earth, thus creating a space island from which trips can be
launched further into space and back to the Earth. 4 This has never
been considered a reasonable or desirable possibility in the areas of
space now commercially used, nor is it so considered now.
Third, much, if not most, of the experimentation which must
initiate the invasion of the upper altitudes is of necessity conducted
through unmanned flight instrumentalities (rockets, missiles, satellites,
etc.). This was not the history of the development of present-day
aviation.
Fourth, almost all of the planned experimentation and development
concerning flight in remote regions is to be performed by national
governments rather than by private enterprises.35
There are other differences, of course, but the four mentioned above
are believed to be the ones most pertinent to the present discussion. To
what extent do they go to the heart of the sovereignty concept so as to
require its modification or discard with respect to high altitude flight?
It has been suggested that military danger may be greater to a
nation on the Earth from a high than from a low altitude, because of
the added range in vision.8 6 Of course, the added vision may render
the exclusion of military spacecraft from national airspace at high
altitudes ineffective as a defense against military encroachments by a
foreign state.
In the commercial field the difference is considerable. Flights into
the upper altitudes would not ordinarily have as their object the captur-
ing of commercial markets in foreign countries, and if they did, merely
84 Von Braun, "Challenge of Outer Space," lecture and film (1955) ; von Braun,
"Prelude to Space Travel," in Across the Space Frontier, op. cit., 12-70.
88 Although see Washington Post and Times Herald, 21 March 1956, containing
a statement of intent by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to launch an artificial
earth satellite in the near future.
36 Von Braun, "Challenge of Outer Space," supra; von Braun, "Prelude to
Space Travel," supra, 50-55.
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using a high trajectory for travel from spot to spot on Earth, control at
the lower altitudes (especially near air terminals) would be sufficient
protection to the subjacent State. Although commercial exploitation
of outlying planets, moons, etc., may well become in time a major
objective of such flights, it would not appear that the policies restricting
national commerce on the Earth's surface are particularly relevant with
regard to the exploitation of those spatial markets. National satellite
areas and national rocket flight paths based upon sovereignty cones
appear not to be scientifically practicable at the present time (or
perhaps ever) because of the speeds at which satellites and rockets must
fly in order to break away and stay away from the Earth.8 7
The matter of the nation as arbiter of personal disputes and guard-
ian of peace and safety in the land is the third vital element underlying
the national air sovereignty concept. It is submitted that the exercise
of such functions in respect to superjacent space presupposes the exist-
ence of certain facts. Pertinently, these are (1) that any disputants be
private parties (or entities) and thus subject to the judicial and regu-
latory power of a national government; (2) the ability to exert actual
power over either the flight instrumentality or the person or organiza-
tion controlling it or both, which normally means that the craft or the
owner or operator at some time during flight operations must be pres-
ent on the surface of the nation wishing to exert jurisdiction. These
facts have up to the present consistently underlain the exercise of
sovereignty within a nation with respect to the superjacent space. The
development of commercial aviation, although widely subsidized by
governments, has been a private venture, carried on by persons and
organizations suable as private parties in civil, litigation and subject to
regulation under the criminal laws of a territorial sovereign. Flight
up until the present day has been almost entirely by manned aircraft
guided by persons within the aircraft itself. Finally, keeping in mind
the over-flight exception to sovereignty, the fact that aircraft are
manned and that in order to do business within a State they have
always found it necessary to land therein, has meant that the State of
territorial sovereignty has always been able to exert physical control
to enforce its rules. In this respect, it has been the history of commer-
cial air development that commercial aviation organizations have estab-
lished places of business within the States in which they operate, thereby
giving the territorial sovereign even greater actual power over them.
Travel in the upper altitudes as presently being developed, differ-
ing from previous air travel in the four ways mentioned, seems to sap
this domestically derived foundation of national air sovereignty of most
of its life so far as it might be used to justify extension of the sovereignty
principle to high altitudes. First, at present and for the foreseeable
future, almost all flights made at those altitudes will be planned,
financed, launched, and directed by national governments, so that the
power which a nation exerts to adjust relations between private parties
87 As to which, see von Braun, "Prelude to Space Travel," supra, 20.
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will have no application. Second, at least for the next few years, most
of the flights will be unmanned, being directed by remote control.
Third, normally the only possibility of actual control over the object,
its occupants (if any), or its owner, will be through physical force over
the object in flight, because landing in a foreign State will presumably
not be an objective of the flight. As stated previously, nation to nation
communication or commerce is not the basic objective. Exerting physi-
cal force over an object in flight is not, even at low altitudes, considered
practicable as a peaceful method of control and would be especially
unsatisfactory with respect to unmanned objects.
From the above analysis it appears clear that the only one of the
basic reasons underlying national air sovereignty which might ration-
ally justify national space sovereignty is that concerning military secur-
ity. Perhaps that is enough. In order to make a judgment as to that,
it will be necessary to determine what the factors are which favor a
rule of free space and then to make a comparative evaluation of all the
relevant factors on each side.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR FREEDOM OF SPACE
The basic factors militating in favor of free space at the present
time are as follows:
1. As presently conceived, flight into the remote regions of space
cannot be accomplished without sooner or later crossing over foreign
states. Considering the rotation of the Earth and the immense distance
to be traveled, such crossing appears to be inevitable. Whether it is
sooner or later depends primarily on the size of the nation in which the
flight is launched.
2. At present it is considered that the primary hope for discovering
data about interplanetary space and for launching interplanetary flights
lies in the placing of man-made satellites in orbits circling the Earth.
To successfully place such a satellite within a reasonable distance from
the Earth, say 1000 miles, will require a speed which will result in such
a satellite's circling the Earth in a matter of several hours.8  In other
words, the satellite will not be able to keep within any national sov-
ereignty cone projection, and in all likelihood will pass through most
such projections during its circumnavigations of the Earth.
3. A significant value of flight into high altitudes is the additional
data which may be gleaned concerning the Earth, an extension of the
benefit which circumnavigation of the globe by sailing ships furnished
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.8 9 This value, of course, inheres
in flight at low altitudes as well, but becomes of considerable new sig-
nificance in the light of the plans for high-speed, nonstop, orbiting
satellites at vastly increased altitudes, making it possible for the entire
Earth to be viewed in a single day.
4. The hazards of high altitude flight, so far as they are known, are
38 Von Braun, "Prelude to Space Travel," supra, passim.
89 See Haley, supra, 650.
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not matters which can be reduced by control by the subjacent terri-
torial sovereign. In low altitude flight, landing, taking off, routes over
mountain ranges, weather forecasting, and similar problems are all
best handled on the local level, coordinated by the underlying terri-
torial sovereign. In high altitude flight the problems are different-
the only takeoff is the original one, mountain ranges are not a problem,
and weather forecasting, at least as known today, does not extend to
the upper regions under consideration. The problems, so far as known,
consist of things such as the general nature of the ionosphere and
exosphere, methods of generating speed without excessive heat, over-
coming gravity to the necessary extent, etc.-matters which can best be
taken up on the drawing board and in the laboratory of the launching
State and, of course, in experimentation in space itself. 40
5. Scientific knowledge in the field is, at best, tentative. That
experimentation is necessary is manifest. That it will be carried on
with great care is obvious, both from the tremendous expense involved
and from the fact that nations responsible for millions of their own
subjects' lives are carrying on the work.
The general conclusion toward which the above factors militate is
that the growth toward interplanetary communication and commerce
should not be stunted by putting impossible restrictions upon it, even
though temporary fears of a military nature may exist.41 Extension of
the national sovereignty principle would indeed impose impossible
restrictions, since the failure of even one nation to permit flight through
its cone could effectively prevent all development in the field.42
A further argument has often been used to bolster the case for free
air. The proponents of freedom of space, from Fauchille through
Jenks, have turned to maritime law for support, stating that the law
of the sea provides the only really apt analogy for use in developing the
law of space. Thus the latter has recently averred that space beyond
the Earth's atmosphere is analogous to the high seas and is and must
always be incapable of appropriation by the projection into it of any
particular sovereignty based on a fraction of the Earth's surface.43
40 See Plumb, "Navy Computer 'Explores' Space," N. Y. Times, April 1, 1956,
p. L 19; Haley, supra, 650-657; McDougal, supra, 75.
41 This consideration differs from a related argument which seems to have
underlain the work of several recent writers, viz., that the sphere of influence of
the Earth itself is limited and that attempts to regulate too far into space must
fail for that reason. See Jenks, supra, 104, wherein he states that the national sov-
ereignty concept cannot be applied beyond the Earth's atmosphere, because the
realities of interstellar space make such a concept "a meaningless and dangerous
abstraction." Cf Cooper, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," supra,
417. That argument may have some philosophical appeal, it having always seemed
anomalous for a tail to wag a dog, but it must be remembered that the City of Rome
ruled the ancient world and that England ruled an empire many times her size.
Nothing has been brought forward to show that the Earth is not in a position to
extend its power throughout the universe.
42 See Haley, supra, 652 with respect to the application of this thought to the
existing U.S. satellite program. Cf Peng, supra, justifying the extension of the
national sovereignty principle, despite all practical difficulties, because of the im-
mense danger to subjacent States which he says otherwise must exist.
43 Jenks, supra, 104. He goes on to cite the lack of international objection to the
United States satellite launching plan as an example of the acceptance of his thesis
in State practice.
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It is true that certain rough similarities exist. Air, like water, does
not readily yield itself to physical occupation. In fact, Grotius, in
arguing for freedom of the seas, analogized the sea to the air, which he
said was by nature incapable of appropriation. 4 4 The two media are
generally considered to be conduits of communication and pathways
to commercial markets. And in each there is an area in which there
may be great potential military danger to nations. Furthermore, the
history of the development of the concept of freedom of the seas bears
a resemblance to what has been happening in air law, evidencing a
struggle between a desire for national control, triumphant in the early
years of sea traffic, and a desire for free access to unexploited markets in
remote corners of the globe.4
5
However, it is well to remember the words of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter:46
"One of the most treacherous tendencies in legal reasoning is
the transfer of generalizations developed for one set of situations to
seemingly analogous, yet essentially very different, situations."
Certain of the alleged similarities, upon closer analysis, turn out
to be differences. First, in sea history it was the powerful sea States
(especially Spain and Portugal) which wanted closed seas and the
States just developing their sea power which wanted open seas. The
reverse has been true in the development of air law.4 7
Second, whereas the military danger from the sea decreases for a
nation as the distance between a foreign warship on the sea and a
seacoast increases, recent thought is that danger to a nation may
actually increase as the distance between it and a flight instrumentality
increases, at least up to as remote an altitude as 1000 miles. 4
It may be that in time the sea analogy will become more pertinent,
when the aspect of commercial exploitation beyond the Earth becomes
dominant. At that time young, growing nations may argue for free
space. However, at the present time commercial markets remain on the
Earth where exploitation tends to be of the small nations by the larger
ones, thus leading the former to desire closed skies.
Perhaps the analogy to be made is to sea law at an earlier stage, long
before the Papal Bulls of 1493, when the sea was first being explored.
The space above the Earth is in much the same situation now as the
high seas were then, when only their fringes had been explored, the
uses to which they could be put were relatively unknown, and even the
means of navigating them were experimental. At this time, and prob-
44 Grotius, "The Freedom of the Seas" (1608) 28 (Carnegie Endowment, Ma-
goffin transl., 1916).
45 See Colombos, International Law of the Sea 40-48 (3rd rev. ed. 1954).
46 Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 603, 74 S. Ct. 757, 765
(1954) (dissenting opinion).
47 See Goedhuis, "Civil Aviation After the War," supra; Goedhuis, "The Air
Sovereignty Concept and United States Influence on its Future Development," 22
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 209 (1955).
48 See p. 391, supra.
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ably for the above reasons, the seas were considered open to all.49 With
only the lower fringes of the space above the Earth explored, with the
uses to which the vastnesses of space can be put largely unknown, and
with the means of navigating through them basically experimental, the
state of man's mastery over the air appears to be very like his mastery
over the sea at that early date. The same necessity for exploration and
experimentation that argued for open seas at that time now argue for
open skies.5 0
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Weighing the arguments for extending the principle of national
sovereignty to the upper altitudes against the arguments in favor of
freedom of space in such regions may be summarized as the pitting of
military security against exploration and discovery. Nations will neces-
sarily differ in the conclusions they reach, depending primarily upon
the extent to which they have a direct interest in the exploration. The
attitude of the primary experimenting nations concerning the military
aspects of space flight may also have a practical effect on such deter-
minations.
As stated above, flight at high altitudes cannot be carried on as
presently conceived without passing through foreign national cone
projections. If military security is considered the dominant factor even
at such altitudes, there are. only two practical alternatives: (1) bar
military flight at such altitudes but permit nonmilitary flight, or (2) if
that is not considered sufficient protection, bar all flight in such regions.
The second alternative seems too restrictive to be tolerated. The first
may be practicable, although it is open to the objection that, since as
a factual matter most flights will be carried out by national govern-
ments, the barring of military flights will very likely not accomplish its
purpose. In using the term "bar" above, the fact is not overlooked
that the national sovereignty principle leaves open the possibility of
bilateral and multilateral treaties granting flight privileges, but it is
considered that the requirements of satellite flight are such that the
consent of all nations is a prerequisite.
If exploration and discovery are considered more important than
the reasonable fears of military encroachment through flight in upper
space, either (1) free space or (2) free space modified to prohibit the
more dangerous forms of military activity should be advocated as the
basic rule for flight at high altitudes. The second alternative here may
for all practical purposes be the same as the first alternative mentioned
in the preceding paragraph, although one might be considered as an
49 1 Oppenheim's International Law 582 (8th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1955).
50 See, e.g., Engel, "Mystery of the Air We Explore," supra, who concludes
by saying (at 64) :
"Nothing is really known of the exosphere or of the upper half of the
ionosphere or of how they may influence events far below on the sur-
face of the Earth, like radio broadcasting and the weather. Man will
not know until he gets exploratory missiles and platforms up there-
perhaps with man himself aboard one day-to find out."
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exception to the sovereignty principle and the other as a modification
of the free space principle, with the latter lending itself more rationally
to the development of an assault principle as suggested above.51
That a compromise between the two absolutes of free space and
national sovereignty is necessary is implicit in Professor Cooper's most
recent proposed solution to the problem.52 Of course, his acceptance
of today's law for the altitudes now in commercial use may be consid-
ered a compromise in itself,53 but the pertinent limitation is that in
the area defined by him as "contiguous space" free transit is permitted
only for "non-military flight instrumentalities." Whether this rule
would effectively prevent military flight above that zone it is difficult
to say; if it did not, it would not appear that the danger to the nations
of the Earth had been satisfactorily reduced. However, the intent is
certainly evident to minimize military danger without thereby render-
ing impossible the desired exploration and discovery.
From the point of view of the United 'States, the free space principle
would appear to be advantageous. This nation is in the forefront of
experimentation in the field of high altitude flight, and it would be
among the first to gain the fruits of exploration and discovery in upper
and outer space. With regard to military danger, while the placing of
restrictions on military use of the upper altitudes would not be objec-
tionable if enforceable, complete freedom of operations in such areas
would more likely work to the advantage of the United States than to
its disadvantage. This is because of its forward position in research.
From the above analysis, the final conclusion to be reached appears
to be that, although due to the factors outlined above, an international
convention might now find more nations voting for an extension of
national sovereignty than for free space, the infant state of knowledge
concerning upper and outer space makes free space the more desirable
basic principle, at least temporarily, for the world and, incidentally,
for the United States. Limitations on the use of the upper altitudes
for military purposes would appear to be unobjectionable if enforce-
able, as indeed might limitations on the use of lower altitudes for such
purposes. For present purposes, however, it seems sufficient to conclude
that above the altitudes in which the Chicago Convention of 1944 is
applicable the principle of free space should reign.
51 See p. 388, supra.
52 That solution is as follows ("Legal Problems of Upper Space," supra, 91):
"(a) Reaffirm Article I of the Chicago Convention, giving the sub-jacent state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric space above
it, up to the height where 'aircraft' as now defined may be operated,
such areas to be designated 'territorial space.'
"(b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to .00
miles above the earth's surface, designating this area as 'contiguous
space,' and provide for a right of transit through this zone for all
non-military flight instrumentalities when ascending or descending.
"(c) Accept the principle that all space above 'contiguous space' is
free for the passage of all instrumentalities."
53 See Goedhuis, "The Air Sovereignty Concept and United States Influence
on its Future Development," supra.
